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International Transmission 
of  Inflation 
Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian 
Science is organized knowledge. 
Herbert Spencer 
It is better to know nothing than to 
know what ain’t so. 
Josh Billings 
The goal of  empirical research in any science is to maximize the number 
of  assumptions which can be securely included in the body of  theory. 
While empirical research can never establish the truth of  any statement 
about the world, conformity of  the world to a particular hypothesis in 
repeated  and varied trials does give us confidence to incorporate the 
hypothesis into the set of  assumptions we use to make scientific predic- 
tions. In cases in which data or measurement tools are lacking, a hypoth- 
esis may gain wide currency on the basis not of  solid empirical successes 
but  of  logical, aesthetic, or even political grounds.  One example in 
economics would be the Phillips curve, another much of  the Keynesian 
revolution. Because of awesome data problems, international finance has 
been particularly prone to intellectual fads in which particular assump- 
tions achieve dominance on the basis more of  the intellectual force of 
their proponents than of  strength of  supporting empirical evidence. 
With many contending and inconsistent hypotheses in the field, once 
the data  are available it  merely takes hard  work  to  find  that  some 
hypotheses are very unlikely to be true given the observations. Thus the 
greatest contribution of this project must be the creation of the consistent 
set of  data on which the rest of our research is based. We have explored 
the conformity of  this data set to the implications of  certain popular 
hypotheses relevant to the international transmission of  inflation. These 
tests, besides their intrinsic interest, served as a quality check on the data 
by highlighting any questionable observations. 
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Our conclusions from the tests reported in this volume can be orga- 
nized around four related issues: monetary versus other explanations of 
inflation, the channels of international transmission of inflation, steriliza- 
tion  and monetary control,  and alternative monetary  arrangements. 
These are presented in sections 17.1 to 17.4, respectively. We write finis 
by proposing a number of  topics for future research suggested by  our 
analyses of the data. 
17.1  Money versus Special Factors 
Two very different views of what caused the inflation of  the second half 
of  the 1960s and the 1970s have been widely propounded. On the one 
hand, there are those who stress the role of special factors: the monopoly 
power of  the business sector and of  trade unions, the substantial rise in 
commodity prices in  1973, and, most  important,  the  OPEC-induced 
increases in the price of  petroleum in 1974-75.’  On the other hand are 
those  observers who  regard  inflation in  general  as a monetary  phe- 
nomenon and this particular episode as just  another member  of  the 
species. According to most proponents of  this view, the United States 
played a key role in the process, its excessive monetary growth being 
exported abroad via the fixed exchange-rate system formally in existence 
until 1973.* 
In broad outline, both explanations are consistent enough with the 
facts that neither can be ruled out. The relative prices of  agricultural 
commodities did increase markedly immediately prior to and during the 
peak inflation years. So  also did the relative price of  oil. Increases in 
monopoly power might have accounted for inflation up until that point. 
At least there was general concern in government and among a relatively 
large segment of economists that they did. Moreover, inflation abated for 
a time once commodity prices fell in relative terms and oil prices ceased 
rising so rapidly. 
By the same token, monetary growth in the United States accelerated 
substantially after 1965. Fixed exchange rates via a variety of  channels 
would normally have been expected to spread that inflationary American 
monetary impulse to other countries.  Moreover, monetary growth in 
1. The clearest statement of  the special-factor view was made by Kaldor (1976). See 
also, Bruno and Sachs (1979), Fried and Schultze (1975) on oil, and Perry (1975, 1980) on 
wage push. Laidler and Parkin (1975) and Gordon (1977) have provided particularly useful 
critical assessments of this view. 
2.  Laidler  and Parkin  (1975), Meiselman  (1975), and Johnson (1976) provide clear 
statements of  the monetary approach to worldwide inflation, but as we demonstrate in this 
chapter there is considerable room for disagreement  among economists who agree that 
inflation is an essentially monetary phenomenon.  Further, many economists who stress 
“special  factors”  assume that the central  bank  accommodates  those  factors by  money 
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most  other industrial countries followed the same general pattern as 
monetary growth in the United States. 
To students of economic history and the history of economic thought, 
the current debate about the causes of  inflation provides just another 
illustration of  the Ecclesiastes dictum “There is no new thing under the 
sun.” In Britain  during the bullionist  controversy at the start of  the 
nineteenth century and then again several decades later during the cur- 
rency-school banking-school  debate almost the exact same arguments 
were being voiced as today. The same is true for the widespread discus- 
sions of  inflation in America at the start of  this century. 
So similar, in fact, have the views of the various participants on each 
side of  this recurrent debate been that proponents of one position at one 
time almost appear to be responding directly to proponents of  the other 
position during earlier and later periods. Consider Irving Fisher’s (1920) 
discussion of  explanations of inflation that rely purely on movements in 
relative prices as an example: “Obviously no explanation of  a general rise 
of prices is sufficient which merely explains one  price in terms of another” 
(p. 14). He soon added, “[n]or will special causes working on selected 
commodities prove to be general enough to explain the concerted be- 
havior of commodities” (p. 16). Fisher concluded instead that the avail- 
able empirical evidence indicated that “the chief disturber of the peace, 
so far as the purchasing power of money is concerned, has invariably, or 
at any rate almost invariably, been money itself, not the goods which 
money purchases”  (p. 35). 
Though Fisher was writing in  1920, his argument could easily have 
been a response to Thomas Tooke and William Newmarch, who more 
than sixty years before had concluded that “in every instance of a varia- 
tion of  Prices, a full explanation of  the change is apparently afforded by 
circumstances affecting the Supply or  Demand” (1857, reprinted in 1928, 
p. 233), or indeed to the modern-day advocates of that position. 
Our own evidence lends very little support to the most recent rein- 
carnation of the special-factor explanation of inflation. In spite of this 
hypothesis’s broad popular  appeal and  rather widespread  support in 
economic policy circles, we find that at best it can account for only a 
minor fraction of  the inflation in the first half of  the 1970s. Monetary 
factors, we find, explain the bulk. 
Both the trade-union and monopoly-power versions of  the cost-push or 
special-factor  hypothesis  would  suggest  that  nominal  money  growth 
either lags behind price changes as central banks react to the unemploy- 
ment resulting from wage and price increases or is unrelated  to price 
changes. Cassese and Lothian in chapter 4 report just the opposite with 
lagged money growth significantly affecting prices but not vice versa. We 
conclude-as  have others-that  a viable special-factor hypothesis must 
rely on increases in the price of  oil and other commodities. 496  Chapter Seventeen 
Darby in chapter 8 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of  the special- 
factor hypothesis as applied to oil before going on to test and otherwise 
evaluate its validity. The gist of the conclusions he reaches in the theoret- 
ical analysis is that for the special-factor hypothesis to make sense either 
of two things would have had to have happened: real income would have 
to have fallen or monetary growth have been increased in response to 
oil-price shocks. 
To assess the importance of  the first of these two avenues of influence, 
Darby incorporates  oil-price terms into the real-income equations of the 
Mark I11 Model. Since these equations did not perform even tolerably 
well for three of  the eight countries in the sample at the outset, he focuses 
upon the remaining five. In only three of these five cases are the oil-price 
terms taken as a group significant. These three countries-the  Nether- 
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States-all  had general price 
controls, however, that were removed more or less coincidentally with 
the increase in oil prices. Canada and Germany, the other two countries 
that Darby considers and for which he could uncover no significant effect, 
did not have controls during the relevant period. Given the tendency for 
price controls to affect the time pattern of  changes in the real and price 
components of nominal income as well as the time pattern of  movements 
in velocity, Darby concludes that the estimated reductions in real income 
may well be spurious. 
So that he can also allow for the indirect effects of the oil-price increase 
on nominal money supplies and on real exports while assessing its direct 
influence  on real incomes and  hence price  levels,  Darby performs  a 
simulation experiment with the Mark IV Simulation Model. Unfortu- 
nately, these results are not at all conclusive. For several countries, the 
simulations are distorted by theoretically perverse effects. In the remain- 
ing instances, the problem of price controls coupled with the differences 
in behavior among countries makes it impossible to say anything defini- 
tive about “the” influence of oil prices on the price level: The price level 
might be increased by anywhere from 0 to 5%.  However, if we translate 
this into the effect on the 1971-75  inflation rate, this amounts to only a 0 
to 1% per annum oil component as compared to the 3.5% per annum 
average increase in  inflation over the previous quinquennium.  Thus, 
while it is possible that the oil-price increase had a significant role in 
increasing inflation, it certainly was not a dominant one. 
Incorporating  oil-price terms directly into their price equation in chap- 
ter 14, Gandolfi and Lothian take a more direct approach than Darby but 
reach conclusions qualitatively similar to his. In almost all of the eight 
countries, they are able to uncover a significant effect in at least one 
formulation  of  their equation. However, the significance of  such effects in 
a given country is not at all consistent among equations. It varies both by 
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they use. Even if  one ignores these differences and focuses upon the 
equation most favorable to the oil-price hypothesis, the estimated effects 
in most countries are still not terribly large. 
In another set of  tests, Gandolfi and Lothian incorporate the relative 
price of  basic commodities as an additional variable in their price equa- 
tions. The results of this exercise are unambiguous. In their regressions 
with  a correction for second-order serial correlation, the commodity 
price variable enters significantly only two times: for Canada with the 
GNP deflator but not the CPI used as the measure of the price level and 
for Italy with the CPI but not the GNP deflator. 
The other question that is highly relevant to the debate over monetary 
versus special factors, and which is logically antecedent to our discussion 
of  channels of  transmission,  is the role  of  the United  States as the 
reserve-currency country. Darby deals with this issue explicitly in chapter 
16 from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. Schwartz in her 
historical overview of  the period in chapter 2 describes the principal 
events in the international monetary arena and the part the United States 
played both during the Bretton Woods years and afterward. Also of 
interest are Cassese and Lothian’s analysis of  movements in American 
and foreign money and Gandolfi and Lothian’s estimates of  expected 
money functions. 
Darby’s theoretical model in chapter 16 illustrates the importance of 
the reserve-currency country in a world of  fixed exchange rates. In the 
model, the reserve-currency country’s money supply (rather than the 
world money supply, which some others have stressed) is the ultimate 
determinant of  the price level in the rest of  the world as well as in the 
reserve-currency country. This exogeneity of  the United  States as a 
source of  world inflation rests on two assumptions: that growth in its 
nominal money supply is independent of  changes in its and other coun- 
tries’ reserves and that growth in its real money demand is similarly 
independent of  foreign influences. 
Darby evaluates this second assumption by estimating a simple distrib- 
uted lag relation between inflation in the United States and growth in M1 
over the previous sixteen quarters. He finds that as the data are averaged 
over progressively longer periods the explainability of  the relation pro- 
gressively increases to the point where, when he uses four-year averages, 
he can account for 97% of the variation in inflation. From this exercise, 
he concludes that if  foreign influences were important, they only oper- 
ated in the shorter term, affecting the transition to a new equilibrium rate 
of inflation, but not the equilibrium itself. 
To examine the validity of the first assumption, Darby reestimates the 
Federal Reserve’s reaction function and includes various measures of the 
balance of payments. He finds that he cannot reject the hypothesis that 
these variables had no influence, over either the full sample period or the 498  Chapter Seventeen 
several subperiods that he examines. In contrast, in chapter 6 he and 
Stockman show that balance-of-payments variables do enter significantly 
in  the money-supply reaction  functions of  the other seven countries’ 
monetary authorities. 
These  findings  moreover  square  with  evidence  that  Cassese  and 
Lothian present in  chapter 4  and that  Gandolfi and Lothian give in 
chapter 14. Using bivariate causality tests, Cassese and Lothian find no 
significant effect-positive  or negative-of  the lagged balance of  pay- 
ments on growth in American high-powered money. They do, however, 
find a significant negative effect running in the opposite direction. 
Gandolfi and Lothian’s estimates of  the expected money functions that 
underlie their price equations tell a similar story: In each of  the seven 
foreign countries, monetary growth in the United States or the domestic 
balance  of  payments-sometimes  both-has  a  significant  effect  on 
monetary growth; in the United States, the balance of  payments is not 
significant. 
Schwartz’s review in chapter 2 of  the institutional framework of  the 
Bretton Woods system supports the results of the econometric analysis. 
Securities denominated in  U.S. dollars were the dominant source of 
increase in international reserves under Bretton Woods, and these out- 
flows had no direct effect on the American money supply. The Federal 
Reserve System’s response to continuing balance-of-payments deficits 
appeared to go little beyond public statements of  concern and cosmetic 
operations. 
We turn next to a detailed examination of the channels of international 
transmission which explicates how a homegrown American inflation was 
exported to the industrialized West. 
17.2  Channels of  Transmission 
The international linkages among national  macroeconomies follow 
four main channels:  goods substitution, bonds substitution, currency 
substitution, and absorption effects. The previous chapters have dis- 
closed evidence that all of these channels have been operative, but not so 
strongly as argued by respective proponents. In this section we examine 
these arguments and the empirical evidence. Section 17.3 then presents 
evidence on the extent to which central bank sterilization policies frus- 
trated or delayed the international transmission of  inflation under the 
Bretton Woods system. 
17.2.1  Goods Substitution 
There are two distinct traditions in the literature as to the nature of  the 
linkages operating through tradable goods. The first, which we associate 
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not perfect substitutes. Thus their relative prices may change temporarily 
as part of  the adjustment process initiated by a monetary di~turbance.~ 
The second view, associated by Whitman (1975) with the “global mone- 
tarists” like Laffer (1975) and usually termed price arbitrage, assumes 
that  internationally  traded  goods indeed  are perfect  substitutes with 
prices continuously and rigidly linked. Further consideration of  factor 
competition between tradable and nontradable goods results in the “law 
of  one price level,” which states that purchasing power parity holds 
continuously,  and  not  just  in  long-run  equilibrium  as  in  Humean 
anal~ses.~  Thus the empirical question to be answered is to what extent 
are goods substitutable internationally, or as Isard (1977) wryly put it, 
“How far can we push the ‘Law of  One Price’?” 
In this volume we have reported a variety of  evidence to support the 
conclusion of  such authors as Isard  (1977), Kravis and Lipsey (1977, 
1978), and Richardson (1978) that goods are substitutable internation- 
ally,  but  far from  perfectly so. This evidence can  be  arranged  on a 
spectrum from direct to most roundabout. The latter, which infers that 
goods (and assets) are imperfect  substitutes from the ability of  non- 
reserve  countries  to  exercise  independent  monetary  policies  under 
pegged exchange rates, is presented at length in section 17.3. The remain- 
der of  the evidence is considered here. 
The most direct evidence is found in the relatively weak price effects 
found in the export- and import-price equations estimated by Darby and 
Stockman in chapter 6.5  Generally, the relative-price effect on the bal- 
ance of  trade is not large although it does increase over time. Experi- 
ments with the Mark IV International Simulation Model confirm that 
Humean movements in relative price levels are implied by  monetary 
shocks whether originating in the United States or abroad.6 
An only slightly less direct sort of  evidence is provided by Cassese and 
Lothian in chapter 4. They use bivariate Granger tests to analyze two 
3.  Dietrich Fausten (1979) has persuasively distinguished the Humean tradition from 
the law of  one price level discussed below. Either the law of  one price level or interest 
arbitrage (discussed in the next subsection) together with ancillary assumptions can be used 
to establish the result that the nominal quantity of  money demanded in a small economy 
maintaining pegged exchange rates is determined by foreign factors. Hence the conclusion, 
if  money supply equals money demand, that reserve changes must supply the money not 
supplied  via  domestic  credit  and  “the balance  of  payments  is  essentially  a  monetary 
phenomenon” (Frenkel and Johnson 1976, p. 21). 
4. The relevant  concept  of  purchasing  power  parity  is  a  ceteris  paribus  one: The 
purchasing power ratio (real exchange rate) is unaffected in short-run and long-run equilib- 
rium by a monetary disturbance. As discussed in note 1  to chapter 15 above, this equilibrium 
value may shift randomly due to such factors as permanent shifts in relative prices. 
5. See tables 6.10 and 6.13. 
6. We refer here only to the Humean effect on relative price levels, since for neither the 
United Kingdom nor Canada does Darby simulate the working of  a specie-flow mechanism. 
For those countries sterilization prevented any substantial impact on domestic nominal 
money of  an American money shock. 500  Chapter Seventeen 
relations: domestic versus foreign inflation and domestic money growth 
versus  domestic  inflation. In the inflation  comparisons,  they use  two 
different measures of  foreign inflation. For the United States as well as 
the seven nonreserve countries, they  use the percentage change in a 
nominal-income weighted index of the remaining seven countries’ GNP 
(or GDP) deflators; for the seven nonreserve countries alone, they use 
the percentage change in the United States deflator. In both instances, 
the lagged foreign inflation rate was significant in fewer than half the 
countries. 
For their tests of  the domestic money-price relations, they used three 
measures of  money-Ml,  M2, and high-powered money-and  the con- 
sumer price index as well as the deflator. For all eight countries, they find 
a much more consistent effect running from lagged values of money to 
current inflation than the other way around. Furthermore, these relations 
exhibit no tendency to reverse themselves during the shorter fixed rate 
sample period ending in the third quarter of 1971. Cassese and Lothian’s 
results thus stand at odds with the assumption of continuous price arbi- 
trage with money supplies adjusting with a lag to changes in  nominal 
money demand induced by foreign price shocks. 
In chapter  14, Gandolfi  and Lothian use  their reduced-form  price 
equation to conduct tests of  the price arbitrage mechanism similar to 
those discussed in section 17.1  for oil and commodity prices. Like Cassese 
and Lothian, they use both the price level in the United States and a 
weighted average of the price levels in the seven countries other than the 
one being analyzed as alternative measures of  foreign prices. In the great 
bulk of  the comparisons these measures are not statistically significant. 
Moreover, in  their  regressions with  the second-order correction,  the 
United States price variable is only significant in both the CPI and GNP 
relations in Japan and the rest-of-world price index only significant in 
both the relations in France. They conclude: “Some evidence of  price 
arbitrage, therefore, exists but even on the most favorable interpretation 
of  the evidence it is weak and hardly universal.”  Similarly weak results 
with a preliminary version of the Mark I11 Model were reported in Darby 
(1979). 
Darby examines  the predictive  power  of  purchasing  power  parity 
under floating exchange rates in chapter 15. His results do not speak to 
the issue of whether goods are perfect substitutes since changes in the 
parity value may occur due to permanent changes of  relative prices.’ The 
major implication for examining historical data is that as the period of 
7.  See Stockman (1980). However,  Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978) attempt to 
make international purchasing power comparisons based on standardized baskets and find 
these to differ from exchange-rate converted nominal income ratios. 501  Conclusions on the International Transmission of  Inflation 
observation is increased, the level of the purchasing power ratio becomes 
less predictable while its growth rate becomes more predictable.8 
17.2.2 
We  have  already  suggested that  the substitutability of  goods may 
transmit inflation from country to country not only by direct price arbi- 
trage but  also by  inducing changes in the money supply. The money 
supply changes are supposed to result from the effect of the trade balance 
on the balance of  payments.  Asset flows may provide important bal- 
ance-of-payments effects even if  the trade balance responds only weakly 
to a monetary disturbance. The extent to which the balance of payments 
affects the nominal supply of money is discussed at length in section 17.3.9 
Recent presentations of  the monetary approach to the balance  of 
payments  have come to stress “interest  arbitrage” rather  than  price 
arbitrage on Dornbusch’s (1976b, p. 1162) “assumption that exchange 
rates  and  asset markets  adjust fast relative to goods markets.”  The 
essential idea is that assets are perfect substitutes internationally so that 
the interest rate in any nonreserve country must equal the interest rate in 
the reserve country plus the expected depreciation in the exchange rate. 
So  long as the expected depreciation is independent of  domestic mone- 
tary policy and the balance of payments, this interest parity relation fixes 
the domestic interest rate and hence the domestic nominal money supply, 
price level, and so forth as effectively as did the law of one price level in 
the early versions of  the monetary approach. 
This airtight conclusion breaks down if  assets (bonds in the macroeco- 
nomic paradigm) are not perfect substitutes internationally because of 
nondiversifiable risk.’O In this case capital flows will change the equilib- 
rium domestic interest rate for a given foreign interest rate plus expected 
depreciation.  This  is  the  essence  of  the  portfolio-balance  approach 
pioneered  by  Branson  (1968,  1970) and  advanced  by  Dan  Lee and 
Michael Melvin in chapters 12 and 13 of  this volume.” With imperfect 
Asset Flows and Monetary Linkages 
8. Thus Darby shows that convergence of  exchange-rate-adjusted inflation rates over 
longer periods of  observation-such  as noted by Gailliot (1970) and Lawrence (1979)-are 
consistent with the equilibrium value of  the purchasing power ratio following a random 
walk. However, it is very difficult to distinguish statistically a random walk from a very slow 
adjustment process as argued by Frenkel (19806, c). 
9. To anticipate section 17.3 a bit, we find that the balance of payments generally does 
affect nominal money growth in nonreserve countries, but only very weakly at first. 
10. This risk may be with regard to exchange-rate changes or to capital controls since 
exchange-rate crises were international events which would affect many countries simul- 
taneously. 
11. Even if  assets were imperfect substitutes internationally,  induced changes in the 
expected exchange-rate depreciation may limit the ability of  a nonreserve central bank to 
choose nominal money growth rates much different from those consistent with interest-rate 
“parity.”  See chapter 15 above and section 7.3 below for details. 502  Chapter Seventeen 
asset substitutability there may be movements in relative interest rates 
analogous to the movements in relative price levels during the adjustment 
period. Again, the balance-of-payments  effect of  the induced capital 
flows may induce the gradual changes in money supply which ultimately 
reestablish equilibrium. In this way, the portfolio-balance approach is 
the asset  market analogue  to the Humean relative  price adjustment 
mechanism. 
The evidence in this volume is generally consistent with the view that 
reserve flows induced by a portfolio-balance mechanism were an impor- 
tant channel  of  international  transmission  under the Bretton Woods 
system. However, the strength of this channel is not overwhelming, and, 
if  we use the simulations as a guide, the actual transmission of  effects 
through this mechanism appears to have been both fairly weak and rather 
drawn out over time. Besides the evidence of  exercise  of  monetary 
control examined in section 17.3  below, our evidence is of several types: 
the tests and other assessments of the interest arbitrage mechanism by 
Cassese and Lothian and by Darby and Stockman and Darby’s simulation 
results with the Mark IV Model. 
Cassese and Lothian report in chapter 4 that for all seven nonreserve 
countries lagged American interest rates were a significant determinant 
of  the domestic interest rates during the pegged rate period. With the 
exception of  Canada, where the effect was largely in the current quarter, 
these effects were typically distributed over a number of quarters. Arbi- 
trage therefore appears to have been rather limited in the short run in 
most countries,  contrary to the implications of perfect asset substitutabil- 
ity, but more powerful in the long run. 
Darby and Stockman on the basis of  their estimates of capital-flows 
equations concur in  chapter 6. With  the exception of  Japan and  the 
United Kingdom, for which the estimated equations were exceedingly 
poor, they find a negative but weak relation between capital flows and 
either the level or  first difference of the domestic versus foreign interest- 
rate differential adjusted for expected changes in the exchange rate. The 
chapter 7 simulation experiments confirm this impression. For Germany 
substantial capital flows result in partial contemporaneous  harmonization 
of domestic money growth to an American monetary shock, but a domes- 
tic money shock does not induce large offsetting reserve flows. For the 
Netherlands, balance-of-trade effects seem quite as important as capital 
flows. However, in  neither Canada nor the United  Kingdom  are the 
simulated effects of the increase in the nominal stock of money in the 
United States at all substantial. An important reason that the simulated 
capital flows are so weak  and easily  sterilized is the small estimated 
liquidity effect of  money shocks on domestic interest rates.” 
12.  Recall from chapter  10 that  the capital flows  induced by  a difference between 
domestic nominal money and its international “parity” value depend upon the product of 503  Conclusions on the International Transmission of Inflation 
17.2.3  Other Channels of Transmission 
The two remaining channels of  transmission to be discussed are cur- 
rency substitution and Keynesian absorption effects. Evidence on both 
channels comes from the simultaneous model, the estimates of the model 
presented in chapter 6, and the results of  the simulation experiments 
described in chapter 7. 
The theoretical rationale for currency substitution is that monetary 
assets denominated in the domestic currency are substitutes in demand 
with those denominated in the foreign currency. In the extreme case in 
which  both are near-perfect  substitutes,  German money holders,  for 
example, will be indifferent between deposits in dollars and in DM, so 
that any contraction in the supply of DM deposits will induce German 
money holders to increase their deposits denominated in dollars by an 
equivalent amount in terms of DM. As the supply cf  money in German 
DM declines, therefore, its velocity rises to offset decreases with the end 
result that income flows in Germany are left unaltered. This Radcliff- 
esque view is contradicted  by the existence of  stable money demand 
functions,  but  it  may  well be that foreign  moneys  are substitutes in 
demand for domestic money. 
One test of  this proposition has been to include a foreign-usually 
United States-(uncovered)  interest-rate variable in the domestic money 
demand  function.  Miles  (1978)  follows  this  procedure  for  Can- 
ada, justifying the inclusion of  the variable within the context of a model 
similar to  that used by Chetty (1969) in his investigation of the substituta- 
bility of  monetary assets within the United States. Other studies of  this 
type are Hamburger (1977) and Brittain (1981). An alternative proce- 
dure, which Brittain also follows, is to examine the cross-correlations of 
the residuals from simple regressions of velocity on time. The authors of 
all of  these studies find support, to varying degrees, for the currency 
substitution hypothesis. Bordo and Choudhri (1982) note that the dif- 
ferential cost of  holding foreign instead of  domestic money is the ex- 
pected change in the exchange rate, but this variable does not enter the 
Canadian demand for money. Further, their reexamination of  Miles’s 
work shows that his finding of  currency substitution was spurious. 
These tests are generally ill suited to differentiate between currency 
substitution and the more general concept of  asset substitution. Indeed 
we would argue that foreign bonds (and domestic bonds!) are generally 
more important substitutes for domestic money than are foreign moneys. 
The return to a domestic holder of  a foreign bond is the foreign interest 
the interest-rate coefficient in the capital-flows equation and the derivative of  the interest 
rate with respect to money. Thus, if  the liquidity effect is small or nil, so will be the capital 
flows. Large liquidity effects are not consistent with  a shock-absorber money demand 
function which distinguishes between unexpected and expected money growth; see Carr 
and Darby (1981). 504  Chapter Seventeen 
rate plus the expected depreciation in the exchange rate.I3 This more 
general concept has been examined in this volume. 
Darby and Stockman  include  a foreign  interest  rate plus expected 
depreciation term in each country's money demand function in the Mark 
I11 Model. For the nonreserve countries they use the three-month U.S. 
treasury bill rate; for the United States they use the three-month U.K. 
treasury bill rate.I4  Only for Japan and the United Kingdom is the foreign 
interest  rate statistically significant. In both instances, moreover, the 
magnitude of  the estimated coefficients is exceedingly small. One possi- 
ble explanation for the disparity between our results and those reported 
in  some other studies may  be simultaneous equations bias  since our 
results are obtained in the context of a simultaneous model and the others 
using single-equation approaches. We conclude that foreign asset sub- 
stitution for domestic money is not an important channel of economic 
transmission among countries. 
The traditional Keynesian absorption channel links one country's in- 
crease in real income to increased demand for imports and hence in- 
creased exports and real income in other countries. On the one hand, 
regressions  of  an extended Barro real-income  equation (reported in 
chapters 6 and 9) find that the distributed lag coefficients on real export 
shocks are insignificant as a group for all countries at the 5% level and for 
all countries except the United States and Germany at the 10% level. 
These results  suggest  that  the  absorption  channel  is  empirically  ir- 
relevant. On  the other hand, absorption effects are the dominant  channel 
of  transmission in the simulation experiments for two countries, Canada 
and the United Kingdom.  Their domestic money shocks, as already 
mentioned, were unaffected by the increase in the money stock in the 
United States. Increases in their exports, however, affected real income 
and, in the case of  the United Kingdom, interest rates.15  Whether the 
importance of  the absorption  channel and unimportance of  monetary 
channels for these countries will survive further study is an interesting 
question. 
17.2.4  Summary 
Neither goods nor assets appear to be perfect substitutes, but both the 
trade balance and capital flows are responsive to movements in foreign 
prices and (expected-exchange-rate-change-adjusted) interest rates rela- 
13. Including this variable and the domestic interest rate in the money demand function 
is  equivalent  to Bordo and  Choudhri's  approach  to currency  substitution  under their 
assumption that bonds (but not moneys) are perfect substitutes internationally. 
14. The expected  changes in  the  exchange rates  are proxied  by  the  predictions  of 
behavioral equations described in section 5.3. 
15. Although  the distributed lag coefficients on export shocks were insignificant as a 
group, individual coefficients passed the f statistic criterion for inclusion in the simulation 
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tive to their domestic counterparts,  with the response increasing over 
time.  Only  weak  evidence  was  found  in  support  of  either  asset- 
substitution  effects  on money  demand or absorption  effects  on real 
income. 
17.3  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
Monetary control by nonreserve central banks under pegged exchange 
rates implies an ability to move domestic interest rates and prices relative 
to their international  parity  values.  So  evidence of  monetary control 
reinforces  the direct  evidence  of  imperfectly substitutable assets and 
goods. The exercise of monetary control is complete or partial according 
to whether induced reserve flows are completely or partially sterilized. If 
sterilization is complete, then the central bank chooses the money supply 
without regard to the induced variations in its reserve assets. Where only 
partial (or no) sterilization is practiced, the induced reserve flows move 
the money supply to a point intermediate between that otherwise desired 
by  the central bank  and that consistent with  the international parity 
values. 
In this section we will assess our evidence on three aspects of this larger 
issue: the prevalence and magnitude of  sterilization among our sample of 
nonreserve countries, whether short-run monetary control was in fact 
exercised by these countries under pegged exchange rates, and the im- 
plications for dynamic stability of  their exercise of  short-run monetary 
control. Finally, we draw out the implications of  this evidence for the 
effects of  central bank intervention  in  the foreign exchange  markets 
under floating exchange rates. 
17.3.1  The Prevalence and Magnitude of  Sterilization 
Complete  sterilization occurs if the contemporaneous scaled balance of 
payments (BIH)  does not enter into the nonreserve central bank’s money 
supply function.  l6 No sterilization occurs if  the contemporaneous scaled 
balance of  payment enters that reaction function with a coefficient of  1 so 
that the money growth rate is (B  + AD)/H,  where the scaled-domestic- 
credit change ADIH is determined independently of  the balance of  pay- 
ments. Partial sterilization occurs if  central bank behavior falls between 
these extremes. 
Traditional presentations of  the monetary approach such as Johnson 
(1976, pp. 152-53)  have made the extreme assumption that nonreserve 
central banks do  not sterilize the balance of payments at all. This assump- 
tion appears to be made primarily for analytical convenience,  since it 
16. To put it another way, the scaled balance of  payments BIH enters the scaled-change- 
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permits analysis  to proceed  conditioned upon  an exogenously  deter- 
mined domestic credit. Mussa (1976, p. 192) makes it clear, for example, 
that a  (partial)  sterilization  policy  will  merely  result  in  exaggerated 
movements in the balance of  payments under the other assumptions of 
the monetary approach. To the extent that proponents of  the monetary 
approach have not taken this assumption seriously, it is hoped that the 
generalized monetary approach model presented in chapter 10 will dem- 
onstrate by example that sterilization presents no real analytical or ex- 
positional inconvenience. 
In the past, at least,  some  monetary  approachers  have  taken the 
no-sterilization  assumption to be a true statement of  how the world 
operates. The reasoning of  Genberg (1976, p. 322) is typical: The nomi- 
nal money supply is determined  by  the international parity values of 
prices and interest rates; so complete sterilization is impossible. Further, 
partial sterilization results in exaggerated movements in the balance of 
payments with no effect on the money supply; this is not attractive to a 
central bank, and so the policy will not be attempted. There are two 
empirical statements here: (1) Nonreserve central banks have no mone- 
tary control. (2) They are aware of  that lack of  control and averse to 
exaggerated movements in the balance of payments. Thus sterilization is 
an empirical, not a theoretical, question. 
Nonreserve central bank behavior is quite strictly limited if they are to 
eschew sterilization. They must formulate their policy in terms of their 
holdings of  assets denominated in domestic currency and forswear any 
goals as to domestic interest rates or  money supply. Herring and Marston 
(1977) and Hilliard (1979) conducted exemplary studies indicating that 
the German and British central banks, respectively, indeed did follow 
active policies of  sterilization. Obstfeld (19804 confirmed Herring and 
Marston’s results for Germany. Connolly and Taylor (1979) used a very 
simple monetary model, but still found significant evidence of steriliza- 
tion for  the ten developed countries they examined, even over periods as 
long as two years.” In work using preliminary versions of  our data bank 
and single-equation methods, John Price (1978) also found evidence of 
substantial sterilization for five nonreserve countries. 
Three separate investigations of  the existence of sterilization policies 
have been reported above in chapters 4, 6, and 11. Although the ap- 
proaches are diverse, the conclusions are identical: Partial or complete 
sterilization appears to have been a universal practice at least for this set 
of  developed nonreserve countries. 
Cassese and Lothian use bivariate causality tests in chapter 4 to ex- 
amine the relation between changes in foreign reserves and changes in 
17. The large standard errors for their seventeen developing countries precluded any 
definite conclusion for them, but all the point estimates indicated only slightly less active 
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domestic  credit.  They  find  that  generally  the  balance  of  payments 
Granger-causes changes in domestic credit, but only for the U.K. and 
Canada is there evidence of  a relation going the other way. Since these 
tests are limited to the two variables and do not speak directly to the 
contemporaneous relation, we do not view them as more than suggestive. 
Darby and Stockman estimate a uniformly specified nominal money 
reaction  function  for  all  nonreserve  countries  in  the  simultaneous- 
equation environment of the quarterly Mark 111 International Transmis- 
sion  Model.  Their  results  for  the  pegged  exchange-rate  period  are 
summarized in tables 6.7 and 6.8 above. The reaction function for Italy 
had little explanatory value, but for the other six  countries, only for 
Germany and perhaps Japan could the hypothesis of complete contem- 
poraneous sterilization be rejected.18  Stated differently, between 87% 
and all of  the contemporaneous effect of  the balance of  payments on 
money growth was eliminated by sterilization policies of  the nonreserve 
central banks. However, lagged responses to the balance of  payments 
ultimately induced a positive relation in all six co~ntries.'~  Thus, while 
quarterly data indicate either complete or partial sterilization, only par- 
tial sterilization would be observed in annual data. 
Laskar investigates a number of  variants of  the Mark I11  reaction 
functions in section 11.3 above. Aside from differences in  estimation 
technique, the major innovation in Laskar's specification  is the inclusion 
of  the lagged scaled reserves stock. This variable enters positively and 
eliminates  most  of  the explanatory  power  of  the lagged  balance-of- 
payments terms, but the results are qualitatively the same as those in 
chapter 6 except that the Netherlands replaces Japan as one of  the two 
countries  for  which  complete  contemporaneous  sterilization  can  be 
rejected.20  In other variants  of  the reaction  functions,  Laskar  found 
indications that in Japan payments surpluses were completely sterilized 
but deficits only partially so and that in the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and France speculative capital flows were partially sterilized while other 
components of  the balance of  payments were completely sterilized. 
It is clear that money-supply reaction functions are a fertile area for 
18. The contemporaneous balance-of-payments effect on money growth was signifi- 
cantly negative (!) for Italy, but little can be made of this given the poor fit of the regression. 
19. In Italy, even the lagged response was negative. 
20.  The inclusion  of  scaled lagged reserves  is  preferable  to four quarters of  lagged 
balances of  payments if  a slow partial adjustment process is operative. Heller and Knight 
(1978), Heller and Kahn (1978), Bilson and Frenkel(1979), and Frenkel(1980a) have made 
recent contributions to the literature on the demand for reserves by central banks. Bilson 
and Frenkel have presented evidence supporting the slow partial adjustment mechanism for 
reserves. Note, however, that a slow partial adjustment of  actual toward desired reserves 
could be accomplished entirely via changes in domestic credit with no effects on the money 
supply; this would correspond to the workings of  the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments. So it is difficult to go directly from the reserves literature to the proper form for 
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future research, but the work reported here in conjunction with earlier 
work strongly indicates that partial or complete sterilization is standard 
operating  procedure among nonreserve developed countries maintaining 
pegged exchange rates. Besides the implications for monetary control to 
be discussed immediately below, this implies that changes in domestic 
credit  are simultaneously  determined with  the balance  of  payments. 
Therefore the standard single-equation estimates explaining the balance 
of payments by changes in domestic credit and money demand variables 
tell us little about the validity of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments.  21 
17.3.2  Short-Run Monetary Control 
The most striking conclusion of the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments  was that nonreserve central banks are impotent with respect 
to their domestic money supplies and interest rates but can attain any 
desired balance  of  payments via their  actions. Either or both of  two 
assumptions have traditionally been offered to justify this conclusion: 
goods are perfect substitutes internationally, and assets are perfect sub- 
stitutes internationally.22  Darby in chapter 10 adds a third condition which 
would imply a lack of  monetary  control: expectations of  depreciation 
which are too responsive to variations in the balance of  In 
recent papers, Stockman (1979) and Obstfeld (1980b, c,  d)  have empha- 
sized that even if  assets are not perfect substitutes, it is sufficient that 
consumers completely discount future taxes for them to act as if govern- 
ment holdings of foreign bonds were their own. In this case a government 
exchange of  foreign for domestic bonds will induce an exactly offsetting 
shift in private demands so that monetary control is again lost. 
Since  any  one of  these four conditions-and  there  are  doubtless 
others-preclude  monetary control, it is difficult to conclusively reject 
the impotence of  nonreserve central banks with respect to their money 
supplies. Nonetheless, the hypothesis is a scientific one and so tests can be 
derived. Two types of tests have led us to the conclusion that nonreserve 
central banks did indeed exercise monetary control under pegged ex- 
change rates: First, we have direct evidence on the two major conditions 
which  indicates that neither goods nor assets are perfect  substitutes 
internationally;  this  evidence  was  discussed  in  section  17.2  above. 
Second, we have evidence that the actual growth in the money supply is 
indeed determined, at least in part, by domestic policy goals. 
21.  See section  10.2 above and Darby (1980) on this. 
22.  As noted in chapter 10,  these assumptions must be coupled with supporting assump- 
tions that the contemporaneous effect of money on prices is positive and on the interest rate 
negative, respectively. 
23. The last is a stability condition explaining perhaps how a central bank might induce 
overwhelming speculative capital flows; it is not applicable to explaining loss of control in 
the absence of  such a speculative crisis. 509  Conclusions on the International Transmission of  Inflation 
One way to see whether nonreserve central banks in fact exercised 
monetary control is to specify and estimate a structural model and then 
determine the implications of the estimates. The Mark 111 International 
Transmission Model described in chapters 5 and 6 is our major effort of 
this sort. A simplified version (the Mark IV Simulation Model) was used 
in chapter 7 to determine how the significant channels of international 
transmission interact, particularly with respect to monetary control. Four 
nonreserve  countries  (United Kingdom,  Canada, Germany,  and the 
Netherlands) were examined in some detail, and only Germany displayed 
any evidence of  the balance of  payments limiting short-run monetary 
control. For Germany an immediate, albeit partial, response of domestic 
nominal money to increased U.S. money was observed, but the balance 
of  payments only slightly offset an upward shift in the domestic money- 
supply reaction function. Thus the model estimates do indeed imply 
substantial short-run monetary control. 
Daniel Laskar in chapter 11 deals with a set of  smaller single-country 
models in the tradition of  Kouri  and Porter (1974), Argy and Kouri 
(1974), and Herring and Marston (1977). Although his estimation tech- 
niques allow for possible endogeneity of  the balance of  trade, Laskar’s 
analysis of  monetary  control assumes that the only significant loss of 
control would occur via offsetting capital flows. The offset coefficient (the 
fraction of  an increase  in  domestic credit offset by contemporaneous 
capital flows) is significantly less than one at the 5% level for all countries 
except Canada, for which the difference is significant at the 10% level. 
While some of the offset coefficients are nonetheless quite high,” Laskar 
measures the independence of monetary policy by a scalar A which takes 
account  of  the extent  to which  induced  capital flows are themselves 
sterilized. This A indicates the fraction of  a shift in the money-supply 
reaction function which will actually be reflected in money growth given 
the central bank’s reaction to the induced balance of payments. Laskar’s 
estimates of A  are all significantly different from 0, and none are sig- 
nificantly different from 1.  Thus a high degree of monetary independence 
is estimated for all seven nonreserve countries. 
The results of both the Mark 111 International Transmission Model and 
Laskar’s smaller models may be criticized as being due to some omitted 
channels such as  that suggested by Stockman (1979) and Obstfeld (1980b, 
c,  d) as described  above.2s  A  set of  relatively  model-free  tests were 
performed, however, that confirm the results obtained from the struc- 
tural models. These tests rely on the fact that in the absence of short-run 
24. For example,  the German offset coefficient of  about 0.9 is as high as any of  the 
estimates listed in Obstfeld’s (1980a, p. 3) summary of  the German evidence and higher 
than any of the simultaneous equation estimates, including Obstfeld’s own. 
25.  A residual cross-correlation check for such omitted channels for the Mark I11 Model 
is reported in section 6.2. No pattern of  significant correlations was found. 510  Chapter Seventeen 
monetary control, movements in money-supply reaction function vari- 
ables other than the current balance of  payments will be uncorrelated 
with actual movements in the money supply. If unemployment increases, 
the central bank might want to increase money growth but the induced 
balance-of-payments deficit will dissuade it from doing so. As reported in 
chapter 10, the growth of the money supply is indeed dependent on these 
domestic policy variables in all the countries, except perhaps the Nether- 
lands. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence from this volume and the work of 
others can be summarized as follows: The central banks of  developed 
nonreserve countries can exercise independent monetary control in the 
short run under pegged exchange rates. Induced changes in the balance 
of  payments will deter them somewhat from deviating from the reserve 
country’s policy, but domestic goals appear to be generally dominant in 
determining actual money growth. 
17.3.3  The Dynamic Stability of  the Bretton Woods System 
The idealized Bretton Woods system survived only some fifteen years 
from the general restoration of dollar convertibility to the breakdown of 
1971. We can now assess the weaknesses in the adjustment process which 
led to this dynamic instability and then consider briefly alternative means 
of achieving equilibrium. 
The adjustment process can  be  described  by  the  following  salient 
features: (1) The evolution of American monetary and inflationary trends 
was determined by domestic factors with international forces playing only 
a transient role. (2) The proximate determinant of inflation in the non- 
reserve countries is to be found in their own past money-supply growth. 
(3) Changes in  American  money growth do not cause overwhelming 
capital flows abroad; trade-flow effects build up only as the resulting 
inflation shifts relative price levels. (4) These balance-of-payments flows 
have little or no contemporaneous effects on nonreserve money growth, 
although the cumulative lagged effect may be substantial. 
The essence of  the process is lagged adjustment to lagged adjustment 
to lagged  adjustment. The long  cumulative  lag  from  an increase  in 
American money growth to an increase in nonreserve inflation can ex- 
plain the failure of  the Bretton Woods system. Table 17.1  illustrates that 
the initial increase in American inflation in 1966-70  occasioned very little 
concurrent rise in inflation in the nonreserve countries. The cumulative 
effect was to shift relative price levels by some 8% since even as non- 
reserve money growth rates finally began to rise in response to growing 
balance-of-payments surpluses, their inflation rates would respond only 
with a lag. The large surpluses of the late 1960s and early 1970s ultimately 
produced sufficient money growth to surpass American inflation in 1971- 
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Table 17.1  Increase in Average Continuously Compounded 
Inflation Rates over 1956-65  Average 
Nonreserve Countries 
Adjusted for 
United  Unad-  Exchange- 
Period  States  justed  Rate Changes 
1966-70  2.4%  0.6%  0.9% 
197  1-75  4.8%  5.6%  8.7% 
1966-75  3.6%  3.1%  4.8% 
Source. Table 1.1. 
1966-70.26  However, the surpluses ultimately became sufficiently large to 
induce a speculative capital flows which destroyed the Bretton Woods 
system. Furthermore, a full adjustment would have required an even 
sharper increase  in the average  nonreserve inflation rate during the 
catch-up period. 
What lessons can be drawn? First, the asset-flows channel was too 
weak to induce large immediate balance-of-payments effects. This may 
reflect more the weakness of  the liquidity effect on interest rates than the 
unresponsiveness of  asset flows to movements in interest  Second, 
Humean relative-price movements do characterize the adjustment pro- 
cess. Third, sterilization policies did result in exaggerated  balance-of- 
payments  flows-some  speculative-which  ultimately  caused  a  very 
rapid increase in nonreserve money growth. 
Besides this adjustment process, three other means were available to 
reconcile short-run monetary independence with long-run equilibrium: 
harmonization  of  inflation  targets,  progressive  changes  in  trade and 
capital barriers, and revaluations. The first of  these may be viewed as an 
alternative means of  harmonizing foreign and American inflation rates 
while the latter two are means of  avoiding that harmonization. 
If  the inflation targets of  the Federal Reserve System and the non- 
reserve central banks were in harmony, the lagged adjustment process 
just described might be equal to the relatively small stress implied by 
26.  All of  the inflation rates in table 17.1 are measured relative to the corresponding 
1956-65 average inflation rates. This implicitly assumes that the 1.1  to 1.6% per annum 
higher nonreserve inflation rates in the earlier period reflect stable trends in purchasing 
power parity. If we were to insist that purchasing power parity has no trend, the 42% change 
in exchange-rate-adjusted  relative price levels from 1955 to 1975 is difficult to explain. 
McKinnon (1980) argues that the comparatively rapid nonreserve money growth and 
inflation rates in 1970-76 contradict the view that American monetary policy caused the 
world inflation. He obviously overlooks that lagged adjustment in the late 1960s requires 
overshooting of  the corresponding American rates in the catch-up period. Such catch-up 
periods are characteristic of  dynamic models in which variables lag behind changes in the 
growth rates of  their long-run equilibrium values. 
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random, once-and-for-all shifts in purchasing power parities. Unfortu- 
nately the strong upward trend captured in the American money-supply 
reaction function was not reflected in  any of  the nonreserve reaction 
functions except the Netherlands.28  Indeed, the average nonreserve infla- 
tion  rates were  3.25%, 3.96%, and 4.25% in  the three quinquennia 
ending with  1966-70,  and  the final increase can be attributed to the 
incipient effects of increased U.S. inflation. So while the trend in Amer- 
ican money growth brought  it closer to those countries (Britain and, 
later, Italy) which would prefer faster money growth, it simultaneously 
moved it away from countries such as Germany which would prefer a 
lower rate of inflation. Thus the incompatible money-supply rules pur- 
sued by the reserve and nonreserve central banks put the lagged balance- 
of-payments adjustment system to a test beyond its powers. 
Given  inconsistent  money-supply  rules  and  a  weak  balance-of- 
payments adjustment mechanism, only two means were available for 
reconciling  the cumulating inconsistencies in  price  levels: changes  in 
trade and capital controls or revaluation. Of course the former may be 
thought of  as a covert and costly version of  the latter. As recounted in 
chapter  2,  these  methods  were  used,  usually  sequentially,  only  in 
extremis.*' The relaxation of controls at the time of  revaluations is the 
apparent explanation for the generally much larger coefficients on for- 
eign prices than exchange rates in both export and import-supply equa- 
tions in the Mark I11 M~del.~" 
In summary, the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism was too 
slow and too weak to reconcile money growth in the face of inconsistent 
central bank inflation goals. Repeated revaluations and fluctuations in 
controls were a politically unacceptable alternative, and thus was born 
the floating regime which has evolved since 1971. 
17.3.4 
The short sample period permits little by way of direct evidence on the 
operation of  the floating exchange-rate  system.  But our evidence on 
monetary control under pegged exchange rates does permit us to draw 
Intervention under Floating Exchange Rates 
28.  The strong upward trend in American money growth is discussed in sections 6.2  and 
16.2. It accounts for an increase of  about 5.7 percentage points in the annualized American 
money growth rate between 1956  and 1976. For five of the nonreserve countries reported in 
table 6.7 the  coefficient of  the time  trend was either  insignificant or negative.  Taking 
account of implied changes in inflation (but not the balance of payments), the Italian trend 
would increase money growth by far more (some 19 percentage points) while the Nether- 
lands effect is similar in magnitude (about 7 percentage points). 
29.  In the simple monetary approach models--e.g.  Dornbusch (1976n)-devaluations 
(appreciations)  are means to induce domestic inflations (deflations) since international 
parities hold continuously. On the present Humean view, such revaluations are means of 
short-circuiting the adjustment process so that appreciations are used to avoid faster money 
growth and increased inflation. 
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inferences about the efficacy of  the widespread practice of  central bank 
intervention. Monetary control is possible only if  shifts in the central 
bank’s  portfolio  between  foreign  and domestic  assets  can  affect  the 
exchange rate consistent with a given domestic money supply and foreign 
variables. Otherwise, the balance of  payments would increase without 
limit if  the nomeserve central bank chose a money supply inconsistent 
with the parity values of  interest rates and prices. Thus our evidence on 
short-run monetary control directly implies that (sterilized) foreign ex- 
change intervention  can  affect the exchange  rate for  a given  money 
supply. This analysis is pursued  by  Dan Lee in chapter 12 along lines 
initiated by Branson, Halttunen, and Masson (1977), Girton and Hen- 
derson (1976), and Henderson (1977, 1979). Conversely, Taylor (1981) 
has found that central banks have been consistent money losers under 
floating exchange rates. While Taylor stresses the destabilizing nature of 
central bank intervention,  central banks must have had an effect in order 
to have destabilized.  So  Taylor’s evidence  supports the feasibility of 
monetary control under pegged exchange rates. 
17.4  Monetary Policy and the International Monetary System 
The results summarized above have important implications for two 
related issues: the control of inflation and the relative economic merits of 
various international  monetary arrangements. Discussion of  either ques- 
tion, however, is to a large extent conditional upon the answer to the 
other. Accordingly, we first focus very briefly on the inflation issue and 
then go on to consider it further within the context of  our discussion of 
monetary standards and exchange-rate regimes. 
To us, the results reported in this volume establish beyond a shadow of 
a doubt the essential monetary nature of  the inflation experienced both in 
the United States and in the seven foreign countries that we and our 
colleagues have investigated. Special factors-oil prices, in particular- 
may have had some impact on the price levels in these countries, but that 
impact was neither continual nor substantial. Controlling inflation there- 
fore reduces to  the problem of controlling the nominal stock of money in 
each of  these countries. Therefore the fact that inflation was not con- 
trolled is attributable to the failure of policymakers in these countries to 
exercise control over the nominal stocks of money. In the United States, 
the reserve country, that failure was largely a domestic matter: The Fed- 
eral Reserve because of  either ineptness or, as we consider more likely, 
political pressure to pursue other goals, steadily increased the longer- 
term rate of  monetary growth over this period. In the nonreserve coun- 
tries, the inability to control monetary growth over the longer term was 
an inherent feature of  the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange 514  Chapter Seventeen 
rates3'  As we point out below, however, policymakers in some countries 
seemed to view that constraint differently from those in others, some 
apparently being content to see their domestic money stock increase with 
that of  the United States. 
Experience in the four years after our sample period ended is instruc- 
tive in both regards. From the start of  1977 to the end of  1980, rates of 
inflation diverged fairly markedly among the countries in our sample. 
Japan and, to a somewhat lesser but still noticeable extent, Germany and 
the Netherlands have consistently had much lower rates of inflation than 
the United States. Two countries, Canada and France, have had approx- 
imately the same pattern of  inflation  as the United  States while two 
others, Italy and the United Kingdom, have experienced considerably 
higher inflation. These figures are presented in table 17.2. 
The experience suggests that in at least three of the seven nonreserve 
countries-Germany,  Japan, and the Netherlands-policy  in the United 
States was of  paramount importance during our sample period. When 
they severed the fixed exchange-rate link, all three were able to contain 
inflation to a much greater extent than did the United States. Presum- 
ably, therefore, had they begun to float their exchange rates earlier, they 
would  have  avoided  much  of  the increase  in  their  inflation  rates in 
1971-75.  The domestic  political  impetus to higher  monetary  growth 
would not have been strong. 
In Italy and the United Kingdom, that most likely would not have been 
the case.32  The subsequent behavior of  inflation in both suggests that the 
high  rates  of  monetary  expansion  and ensuing  inflation  would  have 
occurred even in the absence of  American monetary stimulus. 
Canada and France  are less  clear-cut  cases.  The fact  that both- 
Canada particularly so-have  had broadly similar patterns of  inflation to 
that of the United States since the early 1960s regardless of the exchange- 
rate system deprives us of  a meaningful counterfactual experiment. But 
given the attempts of  both to revalue their exchange rates vis-A-vis the 
United States dollar even before the formal break with Bretton Woods, 
we are inclined to view them also as heavily influenced by policy in the 
United States during our sample period.33 
Comparison of the experience under floating rates with the experience 
under Bretton Woods and in its immediate aftermath suggests therefore 
31.  We interpret the Bretton Woods system here as prohibiting regular changes in 
valuations for these countries. 
32.  In Britain, in particular, the impetus to inflate appears to have been strong during 
our sample period:  Darby and Stockman find that unemployment entered the Bank of 
England's reaction function while inflation did not. 
33. The Canadian versus U.S. dollar exchange rate declined with only minor interrup- 
tion in twelve quarters prior to the formal demise of  fixed rates in February  1973. The 
franc-dollar rate underwent  a  similar quarterly  decline  beginning  six quarters later in 
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Table 17.2  Average Continuously Compounded Growth Rates 
of  Consumer Prices,  1977 through 1980 
Periods’ 
Country  1977-80  1977  1978  1979  1980 
United States  9.85%  6.53%  8.71%  12.48%  11.68% 
Japan  5.11%  4.70%  3.45%  5.49%  6.79% 
Germany  4.12%  3.29%  2.63%  5.24%  5.31% 
Netherlands  5.02%  5.09%  3.76%  4.71%  6.53% 
Canada  9.28%  9.07%  8.10%  9.32%  10.62% 
France  10.45%  8.60%  9.27%  11.16%  12.77% 
Italy  15.15%  13.10%  10.96%  17.19%  19.36% 
United Kingdom  12.37%  11.46%  8.05%  15.90%  14.08% 
Source. Economics Department, Citibank, N.A. 
‘All  inflation rates are computed from the quarter immediately preceding to the quarter 
ending the designated period. The  price index used is the CPI or other index of retail prices. 
that fixed exchange rates are only viable if the domestic economic policy 
goals of  the various countries involved are in harmony over the longer 
run. Conversely, floating rates provide those countries with the degree of 
freedom necessary to pursue different goals. 
In this respect, the breakdown of  Bretton Woods is almost a mirror 
image of  the collapse of  the gold standard in the early 1930s. In the 
thirties, many countries abandoned the fixed-rate gold standard because 
they did not want to import a further contraction in output from the 
United States. In the seventies, many countries abandoned the fixed-rate 
dollar standard because they did not want to import American inflation.” 
In both instances, the moves away from fixed and toward flexible rates 
successfully provided the countries making these changes with insulation 
from foreign disturbances. That fact, in and of itself, provides an addi- 
tional bit of  evidence corroborating our findings.35 
34.  An additional inflation-related factor, as Klein (1978) points out, may have been the 
decrease in the predictability of the longer-term United States inflation rate during these 
years that accompanied the increase in the average rate of  inflation. 
35.  Writing shortly  after the  fact,  Irving Fisher  (1935) used  the  differences  in the 
behavior of  output abroad relative to that in the United  States under the two different 
international monetary standards as a test of the hypothesis that the Depression was in the 
main engendered by money. In the seventies, the differences in the patterns of  inflation 
under fixed and floating rate regimes provide an additional test in favor of the hypotheses we 
have advanced to explain inflation during our sample period. 
Interestingly,  Fisher’s analysis is based, in modern  terms, on a “Lucas”  (price-level 
innovation)  aggregate-supply  curve and either “a law of  one price level” or a Humean 
specie-flow mechanism for countries linked by fixed exchange rates. (It is unclear in this 
presentation whether Fisher contemplates a price arbitrage or monetary transmission, but 
the latter is used in Fisher 1920 cited here.) It appears from his charts that somewhat better 
explanatory  power would  have  been  obtained by  concentrating on  money flows and a 516  Chapter Seventeen 
Why monetary growth in the United States increased and why some 
other countries  were  apparently  content to accept if  not  add  to the 
inflationary consequences of  that monetary growth are the ultimate ques- 
tions.  Attempting to answer them would draw us far afield from this 
study. The burgeoning literature in the field of  public choice and the 
related studies of regulation point to directions in which to search. Both 
suggest  that political  considerations  that make inflation  desirable  to 
government policymakers and other officials are the root cause. How to 
quantify those returns from inflationary monetary policies, how to juxta- 
pose them in a quantifiable way against the costs, not to mention what 
role ideas play in the process, are all crucial questions that at this juncture 
appear to us unanswerable. 
The Federal Reserve System has operated under a legislative mandate 
as well as more subtle political pressure to weigh a variety of  goals in 
formulating  monetary policy.  It is our judgment  that this process  is 
inconsistent with  achieving price  stability. Indeed we see no effective 
means of controlling inflation in the absence of  the birth of a political 
consensus in support of an effective monetary constitution. Such a con- 
stitution might enforce single-minded pursuit of price stability by estab- 
lishing a prespecified growth path for money and requiring the Federal 
Reserve System to continuously maintain money within 1% of that path; 
adoption of  a fixed gold or other commodity standard would also serve.’6 
In any case, it is important that the standard-whether  fiat or commod- 
ity-be  understandable and proof against well-meaning tinkering. Other- 
wise this monetary constitution-like  other constitutional provisions and 
monetary standards in the past-might  fail with no explicit repeal until 
long after the fact. 
Had the Federal Reserve System been constrained by such a rule in the 
postwar  period, we  believe  that the United States-and  many  other 
countries-would  have been spared much of  the economic loss that high 
and variable inflation and the periodic half-hearted attempts to check it 
have  brought. As  Leijonhufvud  (1980)  has  persuasively  argued, an 
appropriate monetary reform or transitional procedure could minimize 
or eliminate the transitional unemployment costs of ending the inflation 
“Barro” (money-supply innovation) real-incomc equation, but the movements are large 
enough that either chain works. 
A more recent statement of  this hypothesis together with supporting empirical evidence 
virtually identical to Fisher’s is Choudhri and Kochin (1980). Lothian (1981) contains a 
similar discussion of  the interwar U.K. evidence. 
36. We do not wish to suggest that a commodity standard would serve equally well in the 
short run. Shifts in gold’s relative price might be a potent source of short-run instability and 
occur due to both monetary and nonmonetary factors. Nonetheless, over long periods of 
time the average inflation rate converges to 0 under a gold standard with a constant mint 
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within the context of  a believable political consensus enforcing the new 
monetary constitution.37 
For the United States, fixing an exchange rate with another country is 
not a viable basis for a monetary constitution. Other countries do have 
this option as well as the options open to the United  As the 
Bretton Woods system indicated, this option fails as a control on inflation 
if the reserve country itself lacks an effective monetary constitution or if 
there is insufficient  feedback of  reserve flows on the domestic money 
supply. 
17.5  Areas for Future Research 
At the end of a project like that described in this volume, researchers 
find it hard to be satisfied with what has been accomplished rather than 
troubled by all the questions which would have been studied had there 
been but time, money, and energy enough. The knowledge  that any 
science develops in smal.1 increments and no one person or group can 
make more than a marginal contribution rings hollow against the wish to 
have done more. By way of  exorcism for these futile wishes, we like our 
predecessors  list the issues that we think particularly  deserve further 
study. 
The most obvious next step would be to extend our data bank and link 
it  directly  with  currently  available  national  data sources.  Lothian  is 
currently making efforts along these lines. When the extended data set 
becomes available, it will be possible to reestimate both the Mark I11 and 
Mark IV Models  and a number of  other relations  applicable to the 
floating rate period. In particular, data for 1979-80  may permit much 
sharper estimates of the effects of changes in the real price of  oil. 
Daniel  Laskar’s  work  introduced  a  number  of  sophisticated  ap- 
proaches to the formulation of  money-supply reaction functions. Those 
are well worth developing and applying to other data sets. 
Stockman (1979) and Obstfeld (1980b, c,  d)  have shown that monetary 
control under pegged exchange rates need not obtain even if  bonds are 
imperfect  substitutes  internationally.  Although  some  of  our  tests 
apparently reject their ultrarationality postulate, it would be interesting 
37.  Feldstein (1979) has recently observed that these unemployment  costs must be 
weighed against the very large present value of  the benefits. Since the costs of  inflation tend 
to grow with  real income, their present value is  much larger than might  appear from 
previous estimates of  relatively small annual cost. Since he analyzes a permanent reduction 
in inflation, Feldstein too must implicitly anticipate a monetary constitution which would 
prevent repetition of  our past mistakes. 
38.  With the understanding, of  course, that choosing a monetary constitution is simul- 
taneously choosing an exchange-rate regime. 518  Chapter Seventeen 
to  see whether private-capital-flow functions do indeed shift in a partial if 
incomplete manner in response to sterilized foreign exchange operations. 
Substitution in demand for domestic money by  foreign money and 
foreign assets did not appear to be important in the tests we conducted. 
Some other economists have reported conflicting results. Further work is 
required to reconcile these differences. 
The behavior of exchange rates in the floating period remains largely 
unexplained. However, Dan Lee’s integration of the information set used 
in forming inflationary  and exchange-rate expectations seems to be  a 
valuable starting point. This approach is pursued to some extent in the 
expectational functions of the Mark I11 and Mark IV Models, but much 
remains to  be  done. Such an approach suggests that with  consistent 
expectations in the bond and foreign exchange markets, a money shock 
will initially affect the exchange rate by an amount equal to the integral of 
the induced deviations between the domestic and foreign real interest 
rates. 
Except for the United States, the Barroesque real-income equation did 
relatively poor and added little if  anything to the explanatory power of 
short distributed lags on the actual changes in aggregate-demand vari- 
ables. An errors-in-the-variables argument is capable of  explaining the 
results numerically, but the weak evidence suggests the value of further 
research. 
Finally, we propose an examination of the political economy of  alterna- 
tive monetary systems. This work has already begun, but is only at the 
earliest stage of  development  at  Given the probability that 
action to change the existing system will be taken in the near future 
whether in ignorance or not, the potential value of research here is great 
indeed. 
Besides these major areas for further research, a number of additional 
topics have been suggested in the individual chapters. Furthermore, it is 
all too likely that the most important leads eluded our notice. We only 
hope that, if that be the case, our readers will correct our oversight as well 
as our other errors. 
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